Pré-sal: concessão VS. partilha

É intenso o debate sobre o marco regulatório que vai orientar a exploração econômica das reservas na região do pré-sal. Se até aqui o Brasil utilizava o regime de concessão, a proposta para o pré-sal é utilizer o sistema de partilha.

O tom da discussão tem sido basicamente empirista: argumenta-se que os países que utilizam o regime de partilha são aqueles com pior arcabouço institucional (veja aqui). A parte de questões como o timing diferenciado dos pagamentos entre os regimes, que acho que tem mais a ver com economia política, o debate tem deixado de lado a teoria econômica por detrás de cada modalide de regulação.

Pongsiri (2004) analisa sob a perspectiva de contratos incompletos que cada modelo permite atender a objetivos diferentes no que diz respeito a controle e provisão de incentivos:

"Development rights can be divided into two basic contract types:

1. concession licenses; and
2. contractual arrangements.

The differences between them arise from different attitudes towards levels of control granted to companies, compensation and reward-sharing schemes, including levels of involvement by governments (Johnston, 1994a; Bindemann, 1999). Under concession licenses, the state owns all mineral resources but the rights to produce the minerals will be granted in exchange for a royalty payment and income taxation from the company to the government. The most common type of contractual arrangement is the production-sharing contract (PSC). Under a PSC, mineral resources are owned by the state, which brings in a foreign company as a contractor to provide technical and financial services for exploration and development operations. The foreign company usually assumes the entire exploration cost risk, and receives a specified share of production as a reward for its initial investment, operating expenses, and the work performed."

Uma descrição mais detalhada do modelo de partilha:

"PSCs are widely used in developing and transitional economies as they are in line with government aspirations to be more proactive and involved in managing the oil and gas resources. The most common combination of agents in a PSC is a host government, or one of its authorities such as the national oil company (NOC), and an international oil company (IOC) which can be an individual firm or a joint venture or a consortium. PSCs generally require the establishment of a partnership organisation between the public and private sectors to monitor operations and participate in decisions regarding production levels and accounting practices. The aim of the partnership effort is to ensure that both parties bring different strengths to the relationship to utilise known sources of energy in the most economical and effective way. In strong and active partnerships, both parties benefit from co-operation. "

E porque as empresas tem associado ao modelo de partilha elevado risco regulatório:

"However, the main aim of the IOC as a private entity is profit maximisation, whereas the NOC of the host country is mainly interested in maximising economic values of the owned resources. As a result, it is not surprising that the objectives of the two frequently clash (Bindemann, 1999). Conflicting views may lead to renegotiation of contracts and less efficient running of the business. Provan (1984) suggests that the formation of partnering relationships between two distinct organisations often leads to some negative outcomes such as increasing complexity, loss of decision-making autonomy, and information asymmetry. In addition, cultural and institutional differences, together with the uncertainties over risk and reward sharing, can also constitute a serious threat to successful partnerships (Jacobs, 1992). This may cause considerable tensions in relationships as the government may seek to alter the IOC's priority towards the NOC to achieve its own organisational goals; for example, by altering energy pricing provisions to reflect and accommodate macroeconomic needs. Mikesell (1975) also found that disagreement often arises if the government changes existing legislation and applies the new rules to existing contractual agreements such as increases in taxation of the IOC contractor and changes in the split of revenue between the IOC and the NOC."

E a conclusão:

"success of PSCs will be not only determined by the willingness of the government to encourage and support the IOC investment on the PSC terms, but also to align the incentives of the IOC over the life of the contract and maximise the economic value of the resources without repeated re-contracting."

Na minha visão, os requisitos para obtenção desse mix ótimo de flexibilidade e garantia de apropriação de retornos, fundamentais para o sucesso do modelo de partilha, são:

(1) acesso à justiça, i.e., capacidade de escrever contratos que sejam observados pelas cortes mesmo em estados da natureza não contidos em jurisprudência, e que sejam garantidos em contingências suficientemente próximas daquelas contratáveis;
(2) independência do Judiciário em relação ao Executivo.

Acho que discutir (1) e (2) como pré-condição para o modelo de partilha vai muito mais ao ponto do que focar a discussão num problema de antecipação ou não de receitas.